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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Independent thinking of the general public, their
newly developed penchant for independent choices
and the widening gap of ideas between different
social groups will pose … challenges to China’s poli-
cymakers
… A harmonious society should feature democracy,
the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity, and
vitality.
(President Hu Jintao, 26 June 2005)
The setting of boundaries is always a political act.
Boundaries determine membership: someone must be
inside and someone outside. Boundaries also delin-
eate space to facilitate the activities and purposes of
political, economic and social life. 
(Blakely and Snyder, Fortress America, 1997, p.1)P ro logue
Every day, in a public-housing residential communityin the former heartland of China’s socialist industry,the city of Shenyang, a group of 31 elderly ladies
and one old man patrol the two gates of an old residential
compound now inhabited by large numbers of laid-off work-
ers and their families. Their main concern is the incursion of
rural migrants into the compound to sell their services in
competition with the informal “courtyard economy” of shoe
repairers and fruit stalls that the local government allows
laid-off workers to operate inside the residential compounds. 
In a different city, Beijing, at the same time, in a gated mid-
dle-class neighbourhood, a group of homeowners are putting
the final touches on a newly-built garden. It is, in fact, not
just a garden, but a community-funded memorial to the four
years of struggle necessary to force the real-estate developer
to complete the original park. At the centre of the small
area, engraved on a large white stone, are the characters
shouwang huayuan — “the garden of vigilance.”
The two communities watch over spaces that are socially,
economically, and politically distinct. The grannies in
Shenyang mobilise to protect (from a competitor in the resid-
ual economy) their entitlement to what is left of the once all-
encompassing welfare reserved for China’s industrial work-
ing class. The homeowners watch over their right to see a
contract honoured and their aspiration to a better and more
autonomous lifestyle fulfilled, at least in their backyard. Both
act in the limited, shared interests of their own community
and contain their grievances within the gates of their com-
pound. They use, however, radically different framing argu-
ments: on one side, the relatively new political rhetoric of
consumer rights produced by the state and its media in the
attempt to guarantee consumers and increase overall con-
sumption rates; on the other, the traditional arguments of
socialist entitlement on which the socialist state has based its
moral legitimacy for decades.  
The two strategies and framing discourses are concretised in
specific spaces that are the result of a radical transformation
of China’s cities. Rather than being solely an outcome of the
commercialisation of urban space, the new spatial distinction
within the city is the result of planning and governance
strategies. 
In this paper I investigate the effects of these spatial arrange-
ments on the production of citizenship rights. My first objec-
tives is to show that, beyond the imperatives of economic
growth, there is a direct relationship between the Chinese
state’s goals of maintaining social stability and containing
social conflicts and the re-zoning of urban residential spaces;
Making Neighbourhoods
T h e  G o ve r n m e n t  o f  S o c i a l  C h a n g e  i n  C h i n a ’s  C i t i e s ( 1 )
LU I G I  TO M B A
1. Support and funding for this research was provided by an Australian Research Council
Discovery Grant DP0662894 entitled “Communities and New Patterns of Stratification in
a Chinese City.”
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Based on several years of field research in urban neighbourhoods situated in several Chinese cities this paper
investigates the effects of housing reform and the spatial reorganization of China’s cities on the recognition of
citizenship rights. It has two main objectives: firstly, to show that there is a direct relationship between the Chinese
state’s goal of maintaining social stability and containing social conflicts and the re-zoning of urban residential
spaces. And secondly to investigate the role that these spaces and their new governance arrangements play in
justifying loyalties towards the state.
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different lifestyles (enshrined in specific residential forms)
often translate into different techniques of government. My
second objective is to investigate the role that these spaces and
their new governance arrangements play in justifying loyalties
towards the state. The social classification produced by status-
defining spaces contributes to the state’s ability to address
both the demand for limited societal autonomy expressed by
the middle classes living in self-managed gated communities,
and the claims to support and basic welfare from disgruntled
workers still anchored to the traditional neighbourhoods by
their dependence on state subsidies. The materials, informa-
tion, and interviews presented in this article were collected
during about ten months of fieldwork and participant observa-
tion conducted between 2002 and 2006 in numerous neigh-
bourhoods in Beijing, Chengdu, and Shenyang.C hi nes e urb a n s pa ce  a ndp op ula ti on m a nage m ent
The recent pace of social change and the need to adapt to
the pressure of global capital have produced new challenges
to the socialist Chinese state. In response to these chal-
lenges, however, the Chinese state seems to have adapted
instead of evolving into a more pluralistic system of interest
representation. Its governmental strategies today serve both
the interests of capitalist development and the need for
social stability and political legitimacy. At their core is the
reclassification of the population through social structures
and new social institutions of stratification. (2)
The traditional cellular structure of the socialist city allowed
the government to classify and administer the urban popula-
tion through the organisation of the families of privileged
urban residents into all-encompassing organisations such as
work-units. While work-units have today either disappeared
or lost most of their traditional administrative functions, large
cities maintain a network of grassroots political organisations
and a clear spatial subdivision that survived the urban con-
struction and the privatisation of housing stock.
Social classification and spatial privatisation, accelerated in
the last decade or so, have also resulted in extreme levels of
residential segregation. Local governments have facilitated
the emergence of this new form of segregation by encourag-
ing communities to build gates around their compounds and
to hire private security guards, but also by encouraging a
functional zoning of the city, targeting certain areas for “gen-
trification,” favouring residential developments in the inner
city and moving production operations toward the periph-
Advertisement for an up-market housing estate in Chengdu 
© Luigi Tomba
2. Carolyn Hsu, Creating Market Socialism: How Ordinary People are Shaping Class and
Status in China, Durham, Duke University Press, 2007. On the discourse of stratification,
see Ann Anagnost, “From Class to Social Strata: Grasping the Social Totality in Reform-
Era China,” Third World Quarterly, 2008, 29:3, pp. 497-519.
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eries. Urban governments in China’s new post-industrial
cities are dependent on the income generated by land re-
development, and their control over land use rights and
building authorisations places them in a crucial position to
determine the shape of the modern city. (3)
This new segregation not only replenishes the empty coffers
of local authorities but also serves an important dual function
of government: it creates spaces where certain social groups
(professional middle class as well as traditional bureaucratic
elite) can enjoy, exclusively, the advantages of economic
transformation; and it contributes to isolating and containing
the resentment of the losers in the process of reform, the tra-
ditional holders of socialist entitlements who are now relegat-
ed to the remaining old socialist communities or relocated to
new anonymous suburbs. 
A spatial re-classification, as Aihwa Ong observed regarding
the “zoning technologies” that led to Special Economic
Zones in the initial years of reform, is “often coordinated
with diverse modes of government, that administer the popu-
lation in terms of their relevance to global capital.” (4) While
explanations that focus on the impact of globalisation provide
a plausible reason for the way urban spaces have been re-
organised after the danwei era, I believe the residential seg-
regation visible in China’s cities also contributes to the legiti-
macy of the state and to extending the reach of its authority.
In particular, while new neighbourhoods produce a variety of
different lifestyles, they also facilitate a gradation of govern-
ment intervention. As we will see below, disciplinary and pas-
toral forms of government combine, in different residential
areas, with varying degrees of societal autonomy and state
intervention: for example, laid off workers in old public hous-
ing compounds experience higher levels of social control in
exchange for access to residual welfare and assistance, while
professionals in gated communities enjoy autonomy from
state interference in exchange for a more “responsible”
behaviour and the privatisation of governance functions.  Gov er ning  he te ro gene ous ci t ie s
Modern Chinese cities have a reputation for being large,
crowded, jammed, and polluted. After years of controlled
urbanisation during the 1960s and 1970s, during which
migration from the countryside was kept in check by dracon-
ian restrictions on geographic mobility through the house-
hold registration system, the economic transformation of the
last three decades has boosted a dramatic urbanisation, with
the population living in urban centres expected to hit 50 per-
cent by 2020, up from 17 percent in 1975. (5)
As in most other cities of the developing world, the popula-
tion resulting from this rapid growth is not at all homoge-
neous. Unlike other cities in the world, however, what keeps
urban social groups apart in China is not only their econom-
ic and social conditions, cultural clustering, ethnicity, or race,
but also each group’s specific relationship with and ability to
benefit from state policies. In the Maoist period, being a reg-
istered urban resident was enough to enjoy substantial privi-
leges, especially in times of scarcity, but today different
social groups share and compete in the Chinese city.
Residents include traditionally state-protected urbanites who
were employed in state factories and are today suffering from
the dismantlement of state-owned industry; public employ-
ees and administrators who still enjoy state patronage; pro-
fessionals and educated youngsters who moved to the cities
in search of new employment opportunities offered by for-
eign and local investments; and those who obtained urban
residence for being “assigned” to an urban work unit through
the official channels in place until the end of the 1980s. But
other groups of “unregistered” outsiders also populate the
city – newly arrived urban dwellers, rural migrant workers
who might be either temporarily or permanently attracted to
the city by a deregulated labour market and by the demand
for household services. The opportunity of these groups to
achieve social security and a decent level of livelihood
depends greatly on their employment situation or on social
networks, as they have very limited access to public welfare
or to the subsidies granted by large enterprises or public
employers to their own workers.
This mix of people, with differing status and relationships to
the state, is a recipe for social conflict over space and
resources, and a nightmare for stability-hungry local institu-
tions. Its emergence posed new challenges to local and
national administrations, and required a substantial overhaul
of the traditional planning culture (6) and urban governance
practices of socialist cities. 
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3. For further elaboration on the role of local government in encouraging and facilitating
residential segregation, please see my “Gating Urban spaces: Inclusion, Exclusion and
Government,” in Ola Uduku and Samer Bagaeen (eds.), Gated Communities: Social
Sustainability in Contemporary and Historical Gated Developments, London, Earthscan,
forthcoming.
4. Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty,
Durham, Duke University Press, 2006, p. 78.
5. United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision, ST/ESA/SER.A/216,
United Nations Publication, 2002.
6. One of the characteristics of China’s post-socialist cities is the re-emergence of a func-
tional subdivision of the urban territory. While the work-unit system required that areas
share functions (for example residence and production) within the same compound, the
new planning culture of the 1990s has increasingly recovered functional specialisation
(commercial, residential, industrial areas) that often characterises capitalist cities. Victor
Sit, The Nature and Planning of a Chinese Capital City, Chicester: Wiley, 1999.
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Making Neighbourhoods: The Government of Social Change in China’s Cities
The rationale for the new governance structure was, there-
fore, to balance two apparently contradictory goals: 1) stim-
ulating urban consumption and turning the better-off citizens
into “autonomous” and “responsible” consumers, while 2)
maintaining a direct patronage over the worse-off and those
potentially more dangerous to social stability. Under the old
socialist system, the population was managed by the work
unit to which individuals belonged. (7) Employers provided all
essential services, produced economic and political depend-
ency (8) and were the main point of contact between urban
residents and the state. Social stratification and processes of
status attainment depended largely on “where” one worked
(a centrally managed state-owned enterprise would guaran-
tee better status than a locally-owned collective enterprise),
rather than on what job one had (a manager would have
enjoyed only marginally better status than a worker within
the same enterprise). (9) Also, status, consumption, and
access to resources were almost invariably channelled
through the work unit, and membership in the work unit
community often extended through more than one genera-
tion. The sense of entitlement of privileged urban employees
and residents became entrenched in generations of urban
workers and remains deeply rooted today, despite the
demise of the work-unit system. One’s position within the
system at the outset of reform also determined one’s ability
to profit from the reform. Employees in high-status enterpris-
es with better housing, for example, benefited more than
others from the subsidised sale of work-unit-owned and pub-
lic housing stock that began in the mid-eighties, and could
use their housing as collateral to obtain financing in the
booming real-estate market of the 1990s. Laid-off workers or
those in work units with a poor housing stock were unable to
profit from the same situation. Stable employment and
access to the privatisation of public goods such as housing
have therefore been important factors contributing to social
polarisation and to shifts in the strategies of urban gover-
nance. (10)
Cities also experienced a rapid and substantial privatisation
of residential space. Large “new cities” for several hundred
thousand people with gated communities of high rises
became the construction standard in most Chinese cities.
These communities, behind walls and guarded by security
guards, are privately owned and managed through a manage-
ment company. They house a new generation of homeown-
ers that today makes up a large percentage of the resident
urban population, whose dream of property ownership has
often been funded by public subsidies and, increasingly,
bank mortgages. 
The privatisation of housing has produced a variety of differ-
ent residential settings in terms of housing quality, manage-
ment forms, and services, as well as lifestyles. Since access to
housing is still largely influenced by an individual’s position in
the labour market, Chinese urban residential areas today
include commercial developments alongside publicly sub-
sidised residential communities, employer-subsidised areas,
and public housing. Based on their management forms, com-
munities can experience more or less self-organisation, more
or less social control, and more or less exposure to political
mobilisation. Thanks to this variety and the interaction of
public and private actors (the management companies and
real-estate developers), Chinese cities also foster a great vari-
ety of lifestyles that are often embedded in different residen-
tial settings, from the remaining work-unit-built compounds
where residents share the same employment history and
interests, to middle class compounds offering a high standard
of services and facilitating consumption, to villa compounds
for the elites producing exclusive lifestyles and atomised exis-
tences. Besides their ability to express physical separation of
classes or status groups, these spaces also often give visibility
to the difference in “quality” (11) between different groups.
Making sense of this complexity is beyond the scope of this
article. While typologies can contribute to simplification, (12)
they inevitably have limited explanatory power. My interest
here is to highlight that 1) there is a social hierarchy among
communities that is concretised by spatial arrangements and
favoured by local administrators, and 2) that this hierarchy
leads to different governmental outcomes. To do so, I will
now focus on two largely different types of spaces that reveal
how different urban residents’ experience with the govern-
ment can be. 
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7. On the social and political role played by the work units see Lü Xiaobo and Elizabeth
Perry (eds.), Danwei: The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative
perspective, Armonk NY, ME Sharpe, 1997; and David Bray, Social Space and
Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origin to Reform, Stanford,
Stanford University Press 2005.  
8. Andrew Walder, “Organized Dependency and Cultures of Authority in Chinese Industry,”
Journal of Asian Studies, Vol LXIII, No. 1, November 1983, pp. 51-76.  
9. See for example Lin Nan and Yanjie Bian, “Getting Ahead in Urban China,” American
Journal of Sociology, Volume 97, No. 3, November 1991, pp. 657-688. 
10. Li Bin, “Zhongguo zhufang gaige zhidu de fenge xing” (The unequal nature of China’s
housing reform), Shehuixue yanjiu (Research in the Social Sciences), No. 2, 2002, pp.
80-87.
11. There is a growing literature on the suzhi discourse in China. See for example Ann
Anagnost, “The Corporeal Politics of Quality (Suzhi),” Public Culture 16, 2004, pp. 189-
208; Tamara Jacka, Rural Women in Urban China, Armonk NY, ME Sharpe, 2006; Yan
Hairong, “Neoliberal Governmentality and Neohumanism: Organizing Suzhi/Value Flow
Though Labor Recruitment Networks,” Cultural Anthropology, 18.4, 2003, pp. 493-523;
Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi, A Keyword Approach,” in The China Quarterly, No. 186, 2006, pp.
295-313; and a forthcoming special issue of Positions: East Asia, Culture Critiques, edit-
ed by Tamara Jacka.
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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
These two types of physical and social space (the tradition-
al working class neighbourhood and the private gated com-
munity), while substantially different in terms of quality,
management style, and forms of socialisation, share two
characteristics: they are enclosed within walls and behind
gates that can be opened or closed at will; and they both
require exclusive membership, in the form of either adminis-
trative registration, property rights, or both. They are
enclosed territorial and administrative units that, despite the
privatisation of urban life, facilitate the classification and
control of the population, and are used to this end by local
administrations. Because of the pervasive involvement of
public actors in controlling the form and organisation of res-
idential spaces, where one lives determines the type of gov-
ernance one experiences, and ultimately affects one’s level
of autonomy from or dependency on the state. Wor king  c la ss  nei ghbo urhoo ds :Ma na gi ng  the  urb an cr is i s
Chinese cities today generally evoke an image of rapid eco-
nomic growth, bustling construction, and rampant con-
sumerism. This impressionistic portrayal of urban life in China
often eclipses the impact of the progressive collapse of the
state-owned industrial system in the second half of the 1990s
that has left many traditionally state-sponsored urbanites strug-
gling with declining life opportunities. (13) Some urban adminis-
trations were faced not only with previously unknown rates of
unemployment (14) and the related risk of social instability, but
also with the disappearance of the work unit, the institution
that had administered the population, overseen welfare provi-
sions, and governed social control for more than three decades.
Urban governments were thus forced to shift the locus of grass-
roots governance away from the workplace to the residential
area, where families of what remained of the worker elites gen-
erally maintained their residence. This required beefing up the
languishing remains of the traditional “resident committees”
that had been established in the 1950s. (15)
When asking residents today about this old tool of political
mobilisation, we often hear, with reference to the cadres of
the old neighbourhood committees, that they were nothing
but “old ladies with red armbands.” Often serving more as
neighbourhood watchdogs and political organisers, the effec-
tiveness of these old ladies in managing the community
largely depended on individual ability and connections with
higher-level officials. From 1999, therefore, in response to
the changing residential situation, the privatisation of hous-
ing, and the unemployment crisis, municipal administrations
pumped public funds into grass-roots governance. New
“community committees” (shequ weiyuanhui, as they were
called in some cities), generally with one elected director
and two vice directors, were established to oversee residen-
tial areas in every city. (16) With differences between cities
(and often within districts in the same city), these territorial
units administer between 1,500 and 6,000 families, and
employ 6 to 20 people (almost all of them women). The
number of employees depends less on the population than
on the type of community and the number of resident fami-
lies in dire social or economic situations. Inside the com-
pound of a major tertiary institution in Beijing, for example,
where almost all of the academic staff have been relocated
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12. For an initial evaluation of these types of residential communities see Luigi Tomba and
Beibei Tang, “The Forest City: Homeownership and New Wealth in Shenyang,” in David
S.G. Goodman (ed.), The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives, London,
Routledge, 2008, pp.171-186.
13. See Lee Ching-Kwan, Against the Law: Labor Protest in China’s Rustbelts and Sunbelt,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007.  
14. The three provinces of the Chinese Northeast have suffered the most from the long-last-
ing restructuring of the state industrial system, making up over one-fourth of the 28 mil-
lion layoffs nationwide between 1999 and 2004.
15. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Berkeley and Los
Angeles, University of California Press, 1968. Benjamin Read, “Revitalizing China Urban
Nerve Tips,” The China Quarterly, No. 163, September 2000, pp. 806-820; and Luigi
Tomba, “Residential Space and Collective Interest Formation in Beijing’s Housing
Disputes,” The China Quarterly, No. 184, December 2005.
16. Robert Benewick and Akio Takahara, “Eight Grannies and Nine Teeth Between Them:
Community Construction in China,” The Journal of Chinese Political Science, Vol.7, No.
1-2, Spring/Fall, 2002; Benjamin Read, “Democratizing the Neighbourhood? New
Private Housing and Home-Owner Self-Organization in Urban China,” The China Journal,
No. 49, January 2003, pp. 31-60; Luigi Tomba, “Creating a Chinese Middle Class: Social
Engineering in Beijing,” The China Journal, No. 51, pp. 1-29.
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An up-market residential estate in Shenyang 
© Luigi Tomba
53N o  2 0 0 8 / 4
to private, purpose-built housing complexes, the committee
is relegated to a cramped room between the bookshop and
a photocopy shop, and has only six members. In Shenyang’s
poorer neighbourhoods, on the other hand, I often found
that even small communities housing many unemployed peo-
ple typically have as many as 15 to 20 committee members. 
Directors and vice directors are generally elected every three
years. The election is generally not very competitive, and
candidates are pre-emptively examined at the district level
(qu) and approved by the “street” level of government (the
jiedao banshichu (17)) before facing the residents’ ballot. The
elections nonetheless provide residents with some sense of
“ownership,” and under the daily supervision of their resi-
dents/customers, I found that elected directors enjoy, in gen-
eral, a very good reputation. The low income and hard work
of the cadres’ often earn them the respect of local residents
and party members. In a resource-starved environment, such
public figures also become important marketing tools for
communities, and channels to lobby the municipal or provin-
cial authorities for more investment or funding for their own
activities. (18) In Shenyang, some directors have become so
popular that their communities are often better known by
their personal names or nicknames than by the official
nomenclature. 
Employees’ salaries vary greatly from city to city. While in
Beijing salaries are competitive with those of public servants, in
Shenyang employees are only paid what is called a “benefit”
(butie), which is below the average income for the city (around
800 Yuan a month, or around US$70), while directors‘ salaries
have recently been raised to 1,000 Yuan per month.
Besides the regular employees, these structures also provide
work to a number of “volunteers” (gongyixing gangwei), gen-
erally unemployed people who “work for the dole” in
exchange for subsidies they receive from the municipal
labour bureau. It is not uncommon to find these figures out-
numbering regular community employees, and utilised in
such services as security, assistance to the elderly, street
cleaning, and other casual duties. 
Apart from organising social activities, arranging party festi-
vals, and promoting cultural, physical, and educational activ-
Community cadres distribute free condoms during a family planning
propaganda activity (Shenyang) 
© Luigi Tomba
17. The street offices are the lowest level of government. Cities, below the municipality, are
administered by “two levels of government and one level of administration,” administra-
tion being the community-neighbourhood and government being the district and the
subdistrict (street) level. With the progressive expansion of the role of communities, dis-
cussion is unfolding on the hollowing-out of street offices, and on their possible future
demise as an intermediate level of governance.
18. Although no one is willing to admit it, the political clout of community directors is a
marker of better access to municipal or district-level funding for renovations and spe-
cial activities. Communities also compete with one another for scarce resources. 
Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
ities in the neighbourhood, shequs have taken over most of the
administrative functions previously performed by either the
work units or the higher levels of urban government. These
include health and security, household registration, (19) the dis-
tribution of unemployment subsidies, low income subsidies,
re-training and re-employment services, and family planning,
as well as the monitoring of “dangerous elements” such as
Falungong practitioners. (20) Every member of the committee is
assigned the supervision of a variable number of families (in
Shenyang generally around 200), and the first task of each
workday is a field visit to their assigned area within the com-
munity to check for developments or new problems.  
Despite this startling array of functions, for which the com-
munities receive funding from the relevant municipal depart-
ments or are supported by the local police office, the com-
mittee is not a level of “government” (zhengfu) but of
“administration” (guanli). Salaries and activities (propagan-
da, social activities, or campaigns) are generally funded by
the municipal Civil Affairs Bureau (minzhengju). 
Despite the emphasis placed by official discourse on the
self-governing nature of these institutions, (21) my interviews
with residents in Shenyang (where the visibility of the sys-
tem is highest) suggested that they are indeed perceived as
“government” agencies. Whenever I tried to explain the dif-
ference between government and self-administration to the
residents I obtained responses such as: “The community
[office] does much more than the government, so for me it
is the government,” or, “Of course they are the government,
they do anything the government does,” or, “If the commu-
nity isn’t the government, who is?” For those who remain
dependent on state support (unemployed, low-income fami-
lies, (22) disabled) these cadres remain, as the work unit used
to be, the most likely point of contact with the state and its
policies. Visits to the higher level “street office” – generally
just a couple of blocks away and also often featuring shop-
front offices – have become unnecessary for most citizens.
A double line of authority (Communist Party and civil
administration) exists formally within the community as in all
other Chinese institutions, although in most places the
Community Director doubles as the Secretary of the party
cell. Where this is not the case, the two leaders typically
become each other’s deputies. Party membership remains
an important characteristic for directors, but not even the
majority of community employees in Shenyang has joined
the party. In general communities do not seem to be an effi-
cient recruitment tool for the party, as average membership
within even the poorest communities did not reach 5 percent
of the resident population.
Volunteers helping to run the community or taking up posi-
tions in the different subcommittees (23) are typically elderly,
have a past as cadres, and have a higher than average edu-
cation. They are generally respected as leaders for their rep-
utation and knowledge of the system, generously contribute
both time and money to social activities and community edu-
cation (as in the “community universities” (shequ daxue) for
the elderly), and play an important role in crucial episodes
of communal life such as major political festivals or the ritu-
als of community election day. When asked to indicate the
person in the community they consider “of the highest qual-
ity,“ residents and cadres alike generally agreed on figures of
this kind, who are active, relatively educated, and long-time
members of the Communist Party.
In Shenyang, where the restructuring of the industrial system
has produced a generation of laid-off workers, (24) the need
for a localised and careful management of the residential dis-
tricts where this disenfranchised working class is living has
been felt more than in booming cities such as Beijing.
Administrative areas here have been consolidated (some
now include up to ten microdistricts, xiaoqu) but remain rel-
atively small compared to Beijing and Chengdu. To better
serve the needs of poor residents, the municipal Civil Affairs
Bureau is making an effort to expand the size and visibility
of the community offices, to the point that regulations now
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19. This is the responsibility of the local police office, but is often performed by guards hired
with funds from the labour bureau, and working in the premises of the community com-
mittees. In general communities have been given increasing responsibility to control the
movement, behaviour, and registration of long-term migrants who might rent apart-
ments in the community on a regular basis.
20. Falungong is a qigong practice that in 1999 was banned by the government and labeled
an “evil cult.” Since then the eradication and prosecution of Falungong practitioners has
continued and has been one of the social control tasks assigned to the shequ. Benjamin
Penny, “The Falungong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong,’” Asian Studies Review, Vol.
29, No.1, March 2005.
21. “Self-management,” “self education,” and “self-service” are heralded as the core of this
concept.
22. The “Minimum Living Standard” scheme (zuidi shouru baoxian, or dibao) is a scheme
funded with local and central funds (the share of central funding in Liaoning had grown
to over 38% in 2003), distributed and monitored through the communities. Families
under the threshold (dibao xian, set by the Ministry of Civil Affairs for the different local-
ities –  in 2006 Shenyang 220 Yuan/month or US$25 per capita, Beijing 300 Yuan,
Chengdu 195 Yuan) are entitled to a top-up to the minimum level and to exemptions
from utility, education, rent, and healthcare fees where applicable. Some 22.4 million
people were entitled to the urban dibao in 2006 nationwide, with almost 80% classified
as unemployed. See Chen Jiandong and Armando Barrientos, Extending Social
Assistance in China: Lessons from the Minimum Living Standard Scheme, Chronic
Poverty Research Centre, Working Paper 67, November 2006; and World Bank, China
Revitalizing the Northeast: Towards a Development Strategy, January 2006.
23. Typically a community of this kind would have a consultative committee (xieshanghui)
and an owner committee (yezhu weiyuanhui), but other active roles include the “build-
ing representative” and a number of other recreational associations that generally are
registered with the community.
24. Eva P.W. Hung and Stephen K.W. Chiu, “The Lost Generation: Life Course Dynamics and
Xiagang in China,” Modern China, Vol 29, No. 2, April 2003, pp. 204-236.
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require every community to have at least 400 square metres
of public offices. Their advancement towards a “harmonious
community” (hexie shequ) is monitored on the basis of a
“100-point standard evaluation” that requires each commu-
nity to reach pre-defined standards in such categories as
organisation, service provision, and party building.
Depending on their ability to attract funding from higher lev-
els of government, communities feature activity rooms, sport-
ing facilities, public libraries, and conference rooms. In one
particularly well-funded community, the activity area and
offices occupied over 2,000 square metres. 
Another element of state visibility in these communities is
the increasing use of CCTV security systems. Manned
24/7 by “volunteer” guards, these very expensive and mod-
ern systems, installed with funds from the Civil Affairs
Bureau, monitor street intersections within the walls of the
compound, even in dilapidated areas where there is little of
value to steal. The whole strategy works more as a deterrent
(in one community I visited, the only recorded criminal activ-
ity over two years was footage of the arrest of a bicycle
thief), but residents generally feel that it improves security in
the areas.
While communities in Shenyang have received an injection
of funds to deal with the unemployed (with almost 40 per-
cent of funds for unemployment relief now coming from the
central government), (25) and in Beijing community work was
stepped up to improve the monitoring of social activities in
preparation for the 2008 Olympics, in Chengdu, poor com-
munities remain starved for resources since the community
building campaign was launched in 1999. 
Mrs. Jiang, a retired engineer, manages a committee and six
employees. She complained that her employees, all women,
have little education and were lucky to get the job: “They
wouldn’t be any good for companies or in the labour mar-
ket.” Mrs. Jiang, who is elected, gets a 900 Yuan salary,
much less than she made as an engineer at her original work
unit. 
The community is much larger than the average in Shenyang
or Beijing, with 26,000 registered residents and an addition-
al estimated presence of 20,000 unregistered migrant labour-
ers. The area is considered at high social risk, for a clearly
visible industrial decline has left many, especially elderly
people, in very harsh living conditions. Mrs. Jiang spends
her time visiting needy households, organising clothing col-
lections in conjunction with local charities, and introducing
self-supporting economic schemes in the community. To
An activity room for the elderly in a Shenyang community 
© Luigi Tomba
25. World Bank, China Revitalizing, op. cit.
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cope with a deteriorating situation, communities often sup-
port a yuanli jingji (courtyard economy) that takes advantage
of the tax exemption residents enjoy for family-run econom-
ic activities within the gates of the community, including
courtyard kitchens, guarded bicycle parking, small repair
shops, or fruit stalls. 
This exemption from taxes and a generally more flexible
enforcement of regulations within the communities often
turns into opportunities for informal businesses. In one com-
munity close to the long-distance coach station, residents
have re-organised their dwellings to offer budget accommo-
dation to recently arrived migrants or students. These activi-
ties are generally unregistered and for the most part ignore
safety and hygienic regulations, but are largely tolerated by
both community officials and the police.
In conclusion, community committees perform a number of
social, policing, economic, and political functions, and con-
tribute to recreating the community solidarity and marginal
economic opportunity that disappeared for many with the
collapse of their work units. This pastoral government of the
population is largely justified by the traditional socialist dis-
course of solidarity, state intervention, and welfare entitle-
ment, and is specifically aimed at the weakest groups in soci-
ety in these residual residential areas.Mi ddl e-c la ss  gat edcom m uniti es
While neighbourhoods that are perceived as potentially trou-
blesome attract significant public resources and create an
impression of “more” government and visibility of the local
authorities, residential areas rich in private resources tend to
avoid government interference. The shequ committee’s work
almost entirely ignores wealthier and privately managed
compounds within its jurisdiction. As Mrs. Jiang once dis-
missed them, “They don’t need us. They pay management
companies to take care of their problems.”  In cities such as
Beijing with a large home-owning class living in gated com-
munities, the amount of territory that the state and its tradi-
tional agents are unable (and arguably unwilling) to govern
directly has grown considerably in recent years. 
In the last decade large numbers of urban residents who
could afford to purchase a house have moved from work-unit
districts to new gated compounds. Many areas of the city
have changed shape, and large numbers of new residential
blocks have been built. This transformation has largely trans-
ferred traditional functions of urban governance to private
“agents.” Riding an ongoing housing boom, a high percent-
age of the urban population has purchased apartments (over
80 percent in Beijing), and many of them depend on private
providers rather than on the state for their daily services.
Many have only sporadic and insignificant contact with
neighbourhood officials and often do not even know what or
where the “committee” is. Community committees set up by
the government, of the type described earlier, do exist, at
least on paper, in all areas, rich or poor, newly built or old,
but wherever a management company runs the show, com-
munity officials have a hard time even entering the com-
pound, let alone performing the same pastoral work as in the
poorer communities. Here, gated spaces have effectively pri-
vatised a range of governance functions, such as security,
hygiene, education, and sometimes even family planning. 
The practices of private governance often resonates with the
state’s discourse of community self-government. (26) Managers
often present the aims of their service as a tool to foster
responsible and harmonious co-existence, while homeown-
ers often reproduce to their advantage the rhetoric of con-
sumer rights and ethical righteousness that now dominates
media reporting on community life. 
These spaces are regulated privately. State regulations on
the management of private estates require that management
companies sign a contract with a democratically elected
“homeowner committee.” In different compounds these
committees act more or less autonomously, depending on
the situation. In Beijing, for example, the number of disputes
between homeowners and managers has been very high in
recent years, and it is common for homeowner committees
to act openly and autonomously to protect owner rights and,
with other spontaneous and more radical associations, to
engage in long and extenuating conflicts with the developer
or management company. Where disputes are not common,
however, spontaneous organisation is less likely, and man-
agement companies generally succeed in neutralising owner
committees and controlling their formation, election, compo-
sition, and activities.
In all cases, however, the gated environment leads to a pri-
vatisation of governance functions. In some residential com-
pounds, this is taken to its extreme consequences. ZX, a
medium-sized Chengdu developer, built and marketed three
different compounds targeting upper, middle, and lower mid-
dle-income customers. What makes ZX special in the mar-
ket is that homes are sold with a “lifestyle” attached. ZX
brands its estates as an entirely different living experience, in
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which owners not only become part of a specifically
designed and organised quasi-self-sufficient environment, but
where the management company will take an active role in
facilitating social interactions, cultural and social activities,
and security. 
The brand “ZX lifestyle” (shenghuo fangshi) includes all
aspects of social life, and at the time of my visit the compa-
ny was in the process of applying for a “lifestyle trademark.”
Each resident is encouraged to join activity groups created
on the basis of a survey of residents’ interests (a chess group,
a soccer group, dance, music, art, travel, environment, etc.),
and the management company proudly maintains that own-
ers are kept busy and always have something to choose from.
ZX calls its management philosophy shede (something that
could be translated as “giving back” to the community), and
prizes the idea that “if society is like a big family, our com-
pany is only a member of that family.” (This struck me for
its similarity to a government slogan often associated with
community work: “The community is my family” — shequ
shi wo de jia). In this case the management company has
entirely replaced the official community committee as the
organiser of social activities. 
One of the principal goals of this form of management
remains, to be sure, the manipulation and control of con-
sumption of goods and services by addressing residents’ con-
sumer choices towards specific forms of consumption and
specific providers. For example, the marketing strategies of
the ZX lifestyle include free membership in a car-owner
club, which grants ZX residents significant discounts and
financial assistance for the purchase of brand-new imported
cars from a car dealer that, unsurprisingly, is fully owned by
ZX. In the same way, family holidays and courses for chil-
dren and adults are marketed through the “ZX lifestyle
office” and redirected to friendly providers, turning ZX’s
owners into unconscious members of a comprehensive con-
sumption scheme offered to them as a consequence of their
new status of homeowner.     
This style of management, replicated to various degrees in
many different neighbourhoods, prevents traditional govern-
ment organisations from intervening in the shaping of
lifestyles and community affairs, and makes policies favour-
ing social integration harder to implement, if not irrelevant. 
To increase this sense of devolution of power to privately-run
gated communities, the 2003 national “Regulations on
Property Management” (Wuye guanli tiaoli, 1 September
2003) allow for state-sponsored community committees del-
egating some traditional government functions to private
managers. In practice, this generally takes the form of a con-
tract that spells out the responsibility of the management
companies. Apart from the direct management, mainte-
nance, service delivery, and security functions, managers’
responsibilities include reporting on and implementing fami-
ly planning policies. However, because of the “sealed off”
nature of the residential areas, and the lack of experience of
private operators, cases of chaosheng, or unplanned births,
are purportedly common inside gated communities. A
Xinhua report in 2003 blew the whistle on gated residential
areas becoming “safe havens of illegal births” (chaosheng
bifeng gang) (27) and denounced the phenomenon of
“unplanned birth guerrillas” (chaosheng youji) or resistance
to the one child policy, despite the fines imposed on births
outside the plan. Officials from the street offices in charge
of family planning are often not given access to gated com-
munities and must rely on the liaison person at the manage-
ment company. Because this is not a priority for the private
operators, the person in charge of this activity is likely to be
unskilled (one company admitted that its family planning
manager was an unemployed ex-driver). 
The difficulty of implementing the family planning policy on
private, gated ground is indicative of what effect governance
reform can have in spaces that are enclosed and governed
privately, but also of the state’s reluctance to intervene direct-
ly in areas where a certain level of social stability is guaran-
teed. The ability of traditional organisations to actually pen-
etrate and influence lifestyles is drastically reduced within
the spaces of the proprietary community, while private
organisations such as management companies are increasing-
ly determining rules of cohabitation and consumption pat-
terns and reproducing the public discourse on “harmonious
communities.” A ssi sta nce  a nd a uto no my :Co mm unit ie s  a nd thel egi t im a tio n of  dom ina ntdi scour se s  
As mentioned earlier, the two forms of enclosed neighbour-
hoods described up to this point (the traditional public hous-
ing enclave governed by a community committee, and the
gated community organised by a management company) are
certainly not the only ones you can find in a Chinese city.
The reason that I concentrated on these examples is that
these are also the places that are popularly associated with
the two most contentious and rebellious social groups in late
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socialist urban China: the disenfranchised and unemployed
workers, and the educated, socially active, and rights-aware
new rich. 
While these governance practices can go a long way toward
satisfying the quest for status and autonomy of the rich and
the fulfilment of basic needs for efficient welfare of the
unemployed, both groups also display a noteworthy support
for the social, political, and spatial engineering explicit in the
community building project. 
To be sure, conflicts, often of a collective nature, are fre-
quent in the built environment, as I and others have shown
elsewhere. (28) What is remarkable, however, is that even the
framing of these local conflicts tends to reinforce the same
rhetoric of community building produced by the official
media and local authorities, and to emphasise the role of
communities in providing assistance to the “weaker groups”
(ruoshi qunti) or in creating autonomous, responsible, and
patriotic citizens. 
In Shenyang, middle-aged unemployed workers largely see
their communities as the only remaining institution protect-
ing their entitlement to welfare as former public employees.
Orphans of their work units, they are likely to have lost their
extended social network as well. After experiencing a “series
of opportunity-depriving events” (29) in their life (from missing
out on education and occupational opportunities during the
Cultural Revolution to the restructuring of industrial enter-
prises in the nineties at a late stage of their working lives),
the generation of 40-50-year-olds sees public assistance as
the only remaining vestige of their once privileged status.
Among the numerous unemployed people interviewed in
Shenyang, younger as well as middle-aged people, I noticed,
for example, a remarkable resistance to abandoning the com-
munity and moving to a different part of town or to a differ-
ent city. Residence in the community allows families to
maintain membership in the system and claim the residual
support guaranteed by the state. Also, when material condi-
tions are very harsh, the availability of housing (often sold
by the former work unit at extremely discounted prices) is
the single best reason to remain in the community.
Dependence on housing and on residence only ceases when
the younger generation “moves on,” but in cities with col-
lapsed labour markets and low salaries, children remain in
the small family apartment for a very long time and eat up
resources rather than producing them. 
The fact that many housing compounds today are not a
reflection of the same “community” of co-workers these peo-
ple used to share grievances with also makes it less likely for
residential areas to become arenas of collective, class-based
protest. Collective grievances are much more common in fac-
tories than they are in communities. The relationship
between state and unemployed at the community level seems
to be based on the mutual acceptance of a rhetoric of assis-
tance. Off the job, former state employees often still regard
the state as a provider. As one interviewee who has been on
subsidies for a while said:
What job do I want? I would be happy with one that
pays 800-900 Yuan a month, but that is about the
same as my family makes in subsidies. Now it’s
impossible anyway. Nobody wants someone like me
with only a basic education. Enterprises now only
want you for a few months, no security, and they
don’t pay your health insurance. So I am better off
staying at home. My parents were low-level cadres
and have pensions, so they can help us, and my
daughter is going to school. When she is finished she
will get a job and help her family.
Another, 38, who receives a 350 Yuan monthly unemploy-
ment subsidy to work as a security guard, likewise said:
I am not really looking for anything else. This is
enough to survive and the situation in the labour mar-
ket is not good; I wouldn’t be able to make more
money. This is a clean and secure job, and the state
will take care of me if something happens.
This is largely also a consequence of the common resigna-
tion before a collective destiny, one that constantly surfaced
during my interviews through the fact that unemployment
has touched nearly every Shenyang working family I have
contacted. Dependence on community welfare is considered
more of a right than a choice. A municipal official in
Shenyang offered a similar view: “These people have been
working for the state and the revolution all their lives, and
we have a duty to support them, whatever the cost.” The
government has made an effort to prioritise the re-employ-
ment of laid-off workers (with tax breaks for companies that
hire them, and subsidies for the fixed costs of hiring), but to
little apparent effect. A survey among “minimum income
support” (30) recipients in Liaoning Province in 2004
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revealed that only 30 percent made use of community based
re-employment services, while overall satisfaction with the
minimum income subsidy scheme reached 70 percent. (31)
Finally, the resigned middle-aged unemployed maintain
almost no hope for themselves, and invest all remaining
social energies in the education of their children. The visi-
bility of community governance, the preservation of a roof,
subsidies, and a highly propagandised but inefficient re-
employment system fits the image of these workers’ expecta-
tions, and their dependence keeps them submissive, despite
an obvious deterioration of their living conditions. 
The community’s role seems to be to keep discontent at bay
through direct engagement and continuous monitoring of
social conditions. The state’s intervention through the com-
munity, which is visible but at best palliative, helps to perpet-
uate this perception of satisfaction, despite an obvious dete-
rioration of living conditions and a reduction of opportunities
likely to span two or three generations. It also turns the prob-
lem into an endemic but slow-burning, rather than explosive
issue.
At the other end of the spectrum, among homeowners in
middle class areas, I found that the convergence of state dis-
courses and individual expectations also limits the potential
for conflicts to jump beyond the walls of the community.
Groups of angry homeowners often justify their collective
actions against greedy developers, management companies,
and even local officials with their collective desire to con-
tribute to building the nation and strengthening China. This
claim finds support in the dominant rhetoric of the middle
class being a “high quality” (gao suzhi) and responsible van-
guard of modernisation and nation-building. Thus, greedy
developers, inefficient management companies, and even
uncooperative neighbours become the embodiment of what
puts the brakes on China’s modernisation, whereas “harmo-
nious communities” acting collectively become fundamental
forces in the advancement of the nation.
Lisa Hoffman has recently written about the “patriotic” atti-
tudes of young professionals in Dalian, who appropriate pub-
lic discourse on responsibility toward the nation in the defi-
nition of their new professional subjectivity. (32) During inter-
views and in community materials, I found a similar attitude
expressed among community organisers and homeowners.
Socialisation in an ethical community is often described as
“the best school to build citizens,” “the cornerstone of soci-
ety,” or “the foundation on which the nation is built.” The
discourse justifying actions against greedy managers or
developers therefore puts communities on the side of the
government’s wish for a stable and “harmonious” society:
“There are more than 100,000 communities in the country,”
declared a document from a community organiser in Beijing.
“If each community succeeded in training its residents to be
reliable citizens, consulting each other and participating [in
community life], than what would China become if not a
harmonious society envied by all?” The emergence of a pri-
vate discourse of reliable, responsible, self-disciplined, “high-
quality” citizens, justifying their grievances by the need to
improve the nation and contribute to its advancement and
modernisation, envisages the construction of a new form of
subjects, disciplined and in tune with the goal of the “com-
munity” project: the transition to a form of government that
relies on the private stakeholder taking responsibility for the
management of society. 
Rather than embodying a societal autonomy that represents
a challenge to the authority of the state, new middle-class
neighbourhoods often project the image of virtuous organisa-
tions that will contribute to social stability and nation build-
ing, a step forward in the civilisation of urban China. They
become tools for reinforcing the state, rather than for “limit-
ing the state” in the way liberalism expects autonomous
social forces to work. 
By arguing in favour of morality, selflessness, and mutual
responsibility, one homeowner committee chair in Beijing
has turned his community into a model of cooperation
between owners, managers, and local authorities, in stark
contrast to surrounding conflict-ridden neighbourhoods. The
idea of a community “where ‘good people’ are bred, self-dis-
ciplined, idealistic, understanding, cooperative, and tolerant”
became an instant hit. I had met him the first time in 2003
when he was not yet in office. When I met him again a year
later we spent a whole afternoon watching tapes of all the
TV programs to which he had been invited. His responsible
communitarianism won recognition from the local and cen-
tral authorities, and he became an adviser to many newly
built compounds struggling with similar problems. In my
meetings with him and in one of his numerous interviews, he
argued that conflicts in communities are a “question of men-
tality”: “Chinese people have gotten rich too fast, and their
spirit is still trapped in simple houses and messy courtyards.” 
When describing his grand project for turning neighbour-
hoods into “ideal states” (lixiang guo), he describes self-gov-
erning communities as the virtual culmination of an evolu-
tionary path to civilisation:
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There are three types of human groups:
First, there are the motley crowds: these get together
only to protect the petty profits they see in front of their
noses. Their moral standards are very low, they have
no values, and they can’t see their interests in the gen-
eral context. They are scattered like birds and beasts.
Then there are the subjugated groups: these people,
for the sake of their survival, for historical or practical
reasons, are subordinated to some kind of authority,
and accept the will of that authority as a condition of
their existence.
Finally, there are the “communities of aspiration”
[yiyuan de gongtongti]: in these communities people
have common expectations; everyone expects that col-
lective interests will be safeguarded, that the private
interests of some will not hinder the interests of all,
that in order to protect some, others will not be bullied
and mistreated, that their leaders will not abuse their
power…and that everyone will protect the fundamen-
tal rule of this community: that everyone – individuals
and organisations alike – accepts the authority of com-
mon regulations and the highest values of law and jus-
tice. Our neighbourhood is such a community!” (33)
While autonomy is a central issue for community organisers,
it is not an antagonistic value. Rather, it is based on those
same principles of order, self-restraint, lawfulness, and moral-
ity that are implied in the government’s notion of self-govern-
ing communities.
Middle-class communities also seem to have developed a
sense of entitlement, not only to a higher standard of living
but also to a driving role in the nation-building process. For
different reasons, and with a focus on civilised socialisation
and daily life, residents often appear as concerned as their
government with the need to improve the population’s qual-
ity. The following, from the head of a homeowners’ commit-
tee, is an example of how the rhetoric of the strong country
and of autonomy can find common ground in the private dis-
course about community ethos: 
The problem of Chinese people not being aware of
or disregarding cultural rules will not be overcome in
the “big issues.” Their education will instead be nur-
tured in the small matters of daily life… We have to
understand that managing our community according
to the law and creating good citizens within our com-
munity are the foundations of the stability of our
country and are the first steps towards the renaissance
of the Chinese nation… If the family and the commu-
nity can’t produce good citizens, what should the state
rely on to create a good society, a good country?…
The education of the people has to start from the fam-
ily and the community, especially the community.
Communities are a civilised environment, the place
where family meets society. They are the corner-
stones of a civilised society. (34)Concl usions
My conclusion is that privatisation of residential spaces has pro-
duced segregation, and that segregation is an essential tool of
government. In large cities experiencing the decline of industri-
al enterprises, residence is increasingly becoming the defining
factor, not only between lifestyles, status, and consumption
habits, but also among styles and forms of government.
Chinese urban communities are traditionally spaces of
intense socialisation and intense government activity. New
tools and practices to govern social order are now in place,
but these practices are still inspired and justified by the two
discourses traditionally behind the CCP’s legitimisation: the
rhetoric of “serving the people” and that of strengthening the
country and the nation. These discourses appeal differently
to different people, and governance practices in Chinese
cities are being tailored to address the specific needs of a
stratified society and to respond to the expectations created
by China’s economic reform among different social groups. 
The Chinese Communist Party has adapted its tone and the
content of its ideology to the new subjects it is helping to cre-
33. Bei Ye, Guanyu jianshe meihao shenghuo de sikao (On building a beautiful life), self-pub-
lished pamphlet, Beijing, 2003. 
34. Title and author withheld. Document in possession of the author. Beijing 2003.
One of the few remaining pieces of industrial heritage in
Tiexi (Shenyang) is in the form of public art 
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ate (the middle classes, the within-the-system unemployed)
by conflating the ethics of liberal rights with that of socialist
assistance. The language of “class struggle” has been
replaced by the language of “harmony” (hexie), but the enti-
tlement of some groups to state support is constantly upheld.
Social conflicts are no longer the engine of a revolution, but
rather a threat to it. 
In the cities, tailor-made governance is largely a spatial,
locality-based process, where the local state uses its control
of the territory to achieve a classification of the population
and remould governing practices accordingly. By defining
status and creating segregation, bounded urban residential
spaces favour the implementation and delivery of these
forms of governance.
In this context China’s long-term processes of privatisation
and reform have, in fact, worked to reinforce the legitimacy
of the authoritarian rulers rather than to reduce it, as the
state and its policies are perceived by the weakest groups as
the last defence against the deregulation of the market, and
by the middle classes as the champions of newly acquired
“rights.”  
The government of communities, although only a piece in the
puzzle of how China is governed, reveals how this regime,
while adapting its strategies, successfully maintains the abili-
ty to shape the territory and govern its people. This still hap-
pens, in some cases, by expanding and mobilising its bureau-
cracy to provide means of social stabilisation, and in others,
by devolving to reliable stakeholders and private agents the
task and responsibility of preserving social stability.  
The aim of this strategy, as much as with other forms of
devolution of power in the countryside, is not so much the
elimination of social conflict (in favour of a harmonious
future), but rather its containment. This containment is not
only the outcome of repressive techniques but works on
three levels. At a territorial level, local officials, mass organ-
isations, or management companies are made directly or
indirectly responsible for the places they manage, and the
territory is often clearly marked and locally administered.
Pressure on these agents to achieve “harmony” comes not
only from the local state but also from the resident stakehold-
ers. At a horizontal level, claims by different clusters of soci-
ety are not allowed to coalesce into systemic protests or to
be represented beyond and above the level of the communi-
ty. Finally, at a discursive level, the sense of entitlement to
state support, often mobilised by the unemployed, con-
tributes to framing personal identities as dependents or sup-
plicants to the state; at the same time the sense of involve-
ment in the project of national strengthening provides mid-
dle-class high-quality citizens with justification for advocating
rights protection for themselves and order for the state. This
is in line with the public discourse about civilisation and har-
mony, which implies support and patronage of the weaker
social groups and the assuming of greater responsibility by
the wealthier. (35)
The concept and language of “community” and “self-gover-
nance,” elsewhere associated with the potential to produce
social and political change from below, have been used by
the Chinese regime to propagate new forms of loyalty to its
rule. These are sometimes framed using the words of social-
ist solidarity, and other times, when necessary, with the lan-
guage of autonomy, self-government, and “quality.” Both
appeal to very concrete aspirations, necessities, and deep-
seated perceptions of the state among different social
groups. Social stability remains the principal objective, one
that can, however, no longer be achieved only through the
imposition of state-designed norms but requires the agency
of formally autonomous and private agents and the making
of new citizens.•
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Glossary
Chaosheng bifeng gang 超生避風港
Chaosheng youji 超生遊擊
Dibao xian 低保險
Gao suzhi 高素質
Gongyixing gangwei 工藝性崗位
Guanli 管理
Hexie shequ 和諧社區
Jiedao banshichu 街道辦事處
Lixiang guo 理想國
Minzhengju 民政局
Butie 補貼
Qu 區
Ruoshi qunti 弱勢群體
Shenghuo fangshi 生活方式
Shequ daxue 社區大學
Shequ weiyuanhui 社區委員會
Shequ 社區
Shouwang huayuan 守望花園
Suzhi 素質
Xiagang 下崗
Xiaoqu 小區
Xieshanghui 協商會
Yezhu weiyuanhui 業主委員會
Yiyuan de gongtongti 意愿的共同體
Yuanli jingji 原理經濟
Zhengfu 政府
Zuidi shouru baoxian 最低收入保險
Dibao 低保
35. Luigi Tomba, “Of Quality Harmony and Community,” op. cit.
